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The Use of Public Opinion Polls
in Continuance and Venue Hearings
Courts are becoming increasingly receptive to the admission of the
results of public opinion polls to show community attitudes and prejudgments as to certain criminal cases in which continuances or changes
of venue are sought by the defendants. Mr. Sherman concludes that
polls may provide a degree of evidentiary certainty now lacking, but
he warns that polls can also be tricky unless properly conducted and
interpreted.

by Edward F. Sherman
THE PROBLEM confronting an attorney for a defendant in a widely
publicized criminal case, such as those
involving Jimmy Hoffa, Billie Sol
Estes, Jack Ruby or some other notorious figure, is usually the same. He
knows that because the case has
aroused intense community interest and
feeling, his client may not be able to
obtain a fair and impartial jury trial.
The remedy available is to attempt
to have the case tried in another community or to have it put off until the
publicity and prejudice die down.
This is accomplished by a motion to
the judge prior to the opening of the
trial for a change of venue or a con1
tinuance.
'Whether the trial judge will grant
the motion is governed by a loose set
of guidelines, and usually neither the
attorneys nor the judge can be certain
just what types and amounts of evidence are required to prove that
enough community prejudice exists. It
is here that the public opinion poll
can be helpful. The public opinion
poll, more than any other evidence, is
capable of providing a scientific demonstration of the degree of community
prejudice.
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This article will review the procedure governing motions for change of
venue and continuance in criminal
cases, explore the recent trend toward
the admission of public opinion polls
in such hearings and consider the factors governing the accuracy of polls.

A motion for a change of venue or
a continuance is generally based on an
allegation that community passions
and prejudices have been raised to the

point that impartiality is impossible
for the average juror. 2 The same
ground, though with different emphasis, is argued in support of both motions. The motion for a change of
venue attacks the place of the trial,
attempting to show that in this hamediate area a jury cannot be found
which has an open mind about the defendant's case.3 The motion for a continuance attacks the time of the trial,
attempting to show that the present
climate is so biased, prejudiced or
emotion-charged that an impartial
4
jury cannot be obtained.

1. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
make no express provision for a motion for
continuance. Rule 21(a) provides for transfer
of a case to another district or division "if the
court is satisfied that there exists in the district or division where prosecution is pending
so great a prejudice against the defendant
that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial
trial in that district or division".
2. Highly publicized criminal cases often involve either a violent or unsavory crime, as in
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961), defendant
accused of six murders; Shepherd v. Florida,
341 U_ S. 50 (1951), four Negroes accused of
rape; United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Deano,
313 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963), defendant accused
of being "mad killer" of three persons; or involve a well-known person as in Beck v.
United States, 298 F. 2d 692 (9th Cir. 1962),
trial of former Teamster president for failure
to report embezzled income; Delaney v. United
States, 199 F. 2d 107 (list Cir. 1952), trial of a
director of internal revenue for theft; United

States v. Estes, Crim. No. 66283 (W. D. Tex.
1963), appeal docketed, No. 20519, 5th Cir.
1963, trial of the Texas financier for mail
fraud; United States v. Hoffa, 205 F. Supp. 710
(S. D. Fla. 1962), trial of Teamster president
for mail fraud.
3. See United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512
(S. D. Tex. 1955), holding that prejudice
against a local political boss was so intense
that a fair trial was impossible in that venue.
But see, United States v. Lattimore, 112 F.
Supp. 507 (D.C. 1953), holding that, despite
publicity, the defendant could receive a fair
trial in that venue, and, in view of the nationwide publicity given the case, there was no
indication that he could receive a fairer trial
in another venue.
4. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. 717 (1961),
where eight motions for continuances made
during voir dire had been denied, conviction
reversed on grounds that "with his life at
stake, it is not requiring too much that petitioner be tried in an atmosphere undisturbed
.".
by so huge a wave of public passion..

A Word About the
Procedure Governing Motions
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with prejudicial headlines or stories or
The Supreme Court has established
incompetent evidence which may have
the rule that motions for changes of
10
seen by prospective jurors;
been
venue and continuances will be denied
(2) testimony of citizens or of opinion
if the judge is satisfied that tie jurors
"experts" as to the dominant feelings
chosen are, in fact, capable of laying
aside any preconceived judgments and in the community concerning the derendering a verdict solely on the evi- fendant's guilt;" (3) evidence of indence presented in court and the law flaimatory or prejudicial radio or
as given to them by the judge. 5 The television broadcasts, speeches, public
indignation meetings, pamphlets, sertrial judge's decision is given strong
mons, etc. 12 This evidence, at best,
overbe
not
will
weight on appeal and
is an unreliable indicator of cornmuniturned in the absence of a clear showing
ty feelings. Inflammatory headlines
of abuse. 6
or prejudicial stories may indicate
In applying this test the decisions
have adopted the further rule that the prejudice within the community, but
judge may defer ruling on the mo- the degree and extent of prejudice are
tions until the entire voir dire has not ascertainable from them.
It is with knowledge of the unreliabeen examined. 7 The burden is thus
placed on the judge to weigh the an- bility of these traditional evidentiary
swers given by the prospective jurors methods in mind that defense attorcalled on voir dire to determine wheth- neys have turned to the public opinion
poll to demonstrate the extent and iner there is such a high degree of prejutensity of community prejudice. The
dice that it would be unlikely that
reason generally given for permitting
chosen
whose
twelve jurors could be
verdict would be untainted by the the judge to accept further evidence
of community prejudice, after listendominant community prejudice.8
ing to the answers of the venire panel,
Finally, after listening to and evaluating the answers of the venire, the is that if he finds that substantial prejudice exists in the community as a
judge is permitted to receive whatever
whole, then a jury panel chosen at
testimony or evidence he feels would
be relevant before he must make his random from the community would be
decision as to whether a fair and im- likely to contain the same percentage
of prejudice.
partial trial is possible. 9 It isin reThe advocates of the public opinion
gard to this portion of the hearing
poll argue that an opinion poll is capathat there is a growing demand for
ble of showing as an exact percentage
techniques which are reliable indicathe amount of prejudice harbored by
and
an
feeling
the
community
tors of
the comnmunity and is competent to
increasing use of the public opinion
prove that a jury panel is not fair and
poll.
The traditional submittals of evi- impartial. A venireman, when interrogated by the court., may not reveal
dence at this stage of the hearing by
the defense to prove community prej- the full extent of his prejudices, because of conscious deceit, fear or poor
tdice might include: (1) copies of
local newspapers prior to the trial, questioning. However, when interroAlso see, United States v. Florio, 13 F.R.D.
296 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), where "time" of trial
was attacked by motion for change of venue,
reversing conviction on grounds that defendant
had been on TV crime commission hearings
only days before trial and intense publicity
had continued up to the morning of the trial.
5. Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2; Brown v.
Allen, 344 U. S. 443 (1953); United States v.
United States Gypears Comapany, 333 U. S. 364
(1948).
6. Addison v. United States, 217 F. 2d 808
(5th Cir. 1963): Beck v. United States, supra
note 2: Greenhill v. United States, 298 F. 2d
405 (5th Cir. 1962); Connelly v. United States,
249 F. 2d 576 (8th Cir. 1957): Mayo v. Blackburn, 250 F. 2d 645 (5th Cir. 1957).
7. Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2; Brown v.
Allen, supra note 2; Rizzo v. United States,
304 F. 2d 810 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Blette-nan, 279 F. 2d 320 (2d Cir. 1960);
United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 33 (S. D.
N, Y. 1956); United States ex rel. Bloeth v.
Deno, supra note 2; United States v. Kline,
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205 F. Supp. 637 (D. C. Minn. 1962).
8. See United States ex rel. Boeth v. Denno,
supra note 2; Blumentleld v. United States, 284
F. 2d 46 (8th Cir. 1960); Delaney v. United
States, supra note 2; United States v. Reece,
(E. D. Ida. 1922); United States v. Bonanno,
177 F. Supp. 106, (S. D. N. Y. 1959).
9. For scope of evidence admitted in support of motions, see Blumenfield v. United
States, supra note 8; United States v. Bletterman, supra note 7; Delaney v. United States,
supra note 2.
10. See United States v. Estes, supra note 2;
Blinnenfield v. United States, supra note 8;
United States v. Blettermnan, supra note 7, for
cases admitting files of clippings from local
newspapers in evidence; Delaney v. United
States, supra note 2, admitting exhibits of
newspaper headlines and condemnatory cartoons.
11. See Blumenfield v. United States, supra
note 8, admitting testimony of a local radio
station manager that in his opinion the defendant could not receive a fair trial in that
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gated by a skilled public opinion poll
questioner, when he is not in court
and has no reason to hide his true
opinions, that same venireman may
reveal a much deeper set of prejudices.

The Recent Cases
of Bloeth and Estes
Two recent cases involved the submission of public opinion polls to
prove community prejudice against
the defendant. In both cases the trial
judge admitted the evidence, disregarding the traditional hearsay argument against their admissibility. But
each, after considering the evidence,
ruled against the motions.
In United States ex rel. Bloeth v.
Denno, 313 F. 2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963),
the defendant was clarged with three
nighttime murders within one week.
They had created a general hysteria
within the community. On the opening day of the trial the defense moved
for a change of venue, submitting to
the court the results of a survey showing widespread knowledge of prejudicial publicity and formation of opinions of guilt by a majority of the
community. The director of the poll
testified that he had been retained by
the defense to conduct a poll and had
interviewed 210 residents of Suffolk
County, New York. The answers to
four of the questions were:
YES NO
(1)Have you ever heard of
Francis Henry Bloeth
who is accused of murdering three people in
0
210
Suffolk Countyl
(2) Do you think he is
203 0
guilty?' 3
(3) Do you know that he
venue: United States v. Reece, supra note 8,
upholding affidavits showing hostility and prejudice in that venue in the absence of counter-

affidavits.
12. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 2, admitting transcripts of radio and television broadcasts relating the defendant's past criminal
record and his confession to this and other
murders and of roving reporter's broadcasts of
curbstone opinions on defendant's guilt; Blumenfield v. United States, supra note 8, admitting flm strips and radio and television
scripts dwelling on defendant's unsavory past;
United States v. Bando, 244 F. 2d 813 (2d
Cir. 1957), admitting evidence of publicity
given attacks on defendant in federal grand
jury rackets investigtion hearings; Delaney
v. United States, supra note 2, admitting testimony of publicized Congressional committee
hearings; United States v. Florio, 13 F. R. D.
296 (S. D. N. Y. 1952), admitting testimony of
televised crime commission hearings.
13. Three had no opinion, one was "not

sure" and three answered "Insane".

Public Opinion Polls
has already confessed?
(4) Do you think he would
receive a fair trial in
Suffolk County? 14

200

10

76 133

The trial judge admitted the results
of the poll, but after bearing the examination of the venire panel, he
overruled the motion on the ground
that Bloeth could receive a fair trial
from the twelve jurors chosen. The
jury found him guilty of murder and
he was sentenced to be executed. On
appeal to the Second Circuit, the conviction was reversed on the ground
that the jury selected did not meet
the standards of impartiality required
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. The court
referred particularly to the high degree of community prejudice shown
by the public opinion poll and relied
on the poll's findings as a persuasive
evidentiary source.
When the much-publicized trial of
Billie Sol Estes for mail fraud began
in the first week of March, 1963, the
Second Circuit's opinion in Bloeth had
just been published. Estes's attorneys,
whose motion for continuance and
change of venue had previously been
denied, hurriedly arranged for a survey to be taken in the El Paso area
on the weekend before the opening
day of trial. The questions were patterned after those used in Bloeth.
Four hundred and fifty interviews
were made in two days by nine untrained interviewers, and the findings
were as follows:

The trial judge, after admitting in
evidence the results of the poll and
volumes of newspaper clippings, decided to postpone making his ruling
until the venire had been questioned.
Seventy-five veniremen were examined
before twelve jurors and two alternates
were chosen. Thirty-two stated that
they had no opinion as to Estes's
guilt, thirty-one stated that they had
an opinion, and twelve revealed some
conflict of interest which would keep
them from being jurymen in this case.
On the basis that a large percentage
of the panel had no opinion and that
all the jurors chosen gave assurances
that they had no opinion and would
try the case solely on the law and the
evidence, the judge denied the defense
motions. Estes was convicted on five
of the fourteen counts of the indictment, and the case is now on appeal
15
to the Fifth Circuit.
The Bloeth and Estes cases, though
not the first to admit public opinion
poll evidence to prove community prejudice, do indicate a growing acceptance by the judiciary of this evidence.
The trend, while enlightened, is not
without its dangers. Because a public
opinion poll carries with it an air of
authenticity which is highly persuasive, care should be taken to see that
the judge is provided with proof of its
reliability and evidence of the scientific techniques used.
In the fifty-five years since Louis D.
Brandeis submitted a brief to the
YES

NO

(1) Have you ever heard of Billie So]1 Estes
who is accused of mail fraud com(-erniug
certain anhydrous ammonia tank
transactions ?

432

21

(2) Do you think he is guilty?

256

49

65

366

(3) Do you know whether or not he h;
fessed his guilt?

DON'T KNOW

134

(4) Have you read or heard that Estes was
convicted of swindling in Tyler, Texas,
last November?

278

146

28

(5) Have you read or heard that the other defendants in the El Paso case have pleaded
guilty?

163

255

14

(6) Have the Estes scandals been widely discussed in El Paso County?

336

54

27

Do most people in El Paso think Estes is
guilty ?

288

31

122

(7)

Edward F. Sherman received his
LL.B. degree from the Harvard
Law School in 1962. He served as
law clerk to Judge R. E. Thomason of the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Texas, and he now practices law in
El Paso.

United States Supreme Court in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412 (1908),
with two pages of legal argument and
over a hundred pages of economic, social and medical data, social science
data have become an accepted source
of legal evidence. The public opinion
poll, after developing a reputation for
accuracy in determining consumer
preferences and voters' opinions in the
1920's, became one of the sources of
sociological evidence. 16 When Sweatt
v. Painter,339 U. S. 629 (1950), came
before the Supreme Court in 1949,
Texas, arguing in support of its segregated law school system, submitted
findings from a survey by a professional research group showing that
four-fifths of the whites and three-

14. One had no opinion.
15. United States v. Estes, svpra note 2.
Estes's 1962 conviction of swindling in a state
court was upheld on January 20, 1964, by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.
16. See Tanenhaus, Social Science in Civil
Rights Litigation, in ASPECTS or LinEaTy, 91-114
(1958): Waterbury, Opinion Surveys in Civil
Litigation, 17 Pun. Orm. Q. 71 (1953); Kennedy, Law and the Courts, in THE POLLs ANDO
PUSLIC OPINION (1949); Sorensen and Sorensen, The Admissibility and Use of Opinion
Research Evidence, 28 N. Y. U. L. Rav. 1213
(1953); note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: The Pollsters Go to Court 66 HAMy. L.

Rav. 498 (1953).
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fifths of the Negroes in the state favored segregated universities.
The public opinion poll was ideally
suited for providing sociological evidence of which an appellate court
could take judicial notice in determining the constitutionality of a statute,
but its acceptance as primary evidence
before a trial judge was more difficult
to uphold.
One of the first attempts to use a
public opinion poll as evidence in support of motions for a continuance and
a change of venue occurred in 1953 in
State v. Irvin, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla.).
Irvin and two other Negroes had been
convicted in Lake County, Florida, of
raping a sixteen-year-old white girl,
but the conviction was reversed by the
United States Supreme Court on a
technicality and the trial reset in
neighboring Marion County. Irvin's
attorneys sought a change of venue or
a continuance. The Elmo Roper Research and Public Opinion Organization was hired at a cost of more than
$7,000, paid by the N.A.A.C.P. Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, and
trained interviewers questioned more
than 1,500 adults on a quota sampling basis in Lake and Marion Counties and in two more distant counties.
The survey director and the field supervisor testified to the methods used
in conducting the poll and to the results showing that a much more prejudicial climate existed in Lake and
Marion Counties than in the more distant counties. After hearing the testimony, the trial judge excluded it as
hearsay because the witnesses had not
themselves done the interviewing. The
Supreme Court of Florida sustained
the refusal to admit the evidence.
There are three theories which have
been used by courts to avoid the
hearsay stumbling block.
The expert witness theory would
permit the professional pollster who
conducted the poll to take the stand
and testify, as an expert, as to what
conclusions he can draw from the results of the poll based on the polling
techniques used. 17 This theory, however, has not fared well with the
courts. The poll director in Irvin was
permitted to testify only as to the
methods used in conducting the survey, while only the actual interview-
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ers would have been permitted to
testify as to the answers given. In
Elgin National Watch Company v.
Elgin Clock Company, 26 F. 2d 376 (D.
Dela. 1928), in which a survey was
taken to determine whether the average person would confuse the names
of the two companies involved, it was
held that the director of the survey
was not giving an expert opinion, but
only testifying as to the facts of what
the interviewees said, and so he was
relating hearsay.
The second theory, the public witness theory, would permit the poll director to testify to the results of the
poll as a public witness who is merely
relating his opinion of what the community mind on the issue is. This has
been the traditional method for getting evidence of community prejudice
before the judge in continuance and
venue hearings. The drawback to the
use of public witnesses is, as Lester
Waterbury has written: "The poisonous feature of the public witness method is, of course, that all too frequently
they are selected not impartially but
because they will testify the way the
party selecting them wants them to
testify."18 Nevertheless, courts have
been willing to admit the testimony
of public witnesses, often knowing
that they are testifying as the party
who selected them wishes, while rejecting public opinion polls as hearsay.
There have been no direct holdings
that the public witness exception is
broad enough to include the results of
public opinion polls, but the readily
granted admissibility of polls in Bloeth
and Estes may indicate a growing acceptance of this theory. If the pollster
may testify as a public witness as to
what he thinks are the opinions of the
community, it does not seem to stretch
the logic too far to permit him to testify as to the results of questionnaires
answered under his direction and as
to his conclusions in interpreting the
results into mathematical percentages
applicable to the entire community.
The third theory, judicial notice,
may be the simplest way around the
hearsay problem. Since the judge in
a continuance or venue hearing is
given the widest latitude in admitting
evidence which would aid him in de-

American Bar Association Journal

termining whether a fair trial is possible, he should be able to take judicial notice of the fact that the public
opinion poll is a recognized method of
determining community opinion and
that its results deserve some cred19
ence.
However, liberal judicial notice of
the results of opinion polls, while it
avoids the inconsistency of admitting
the testimony of public witnesses and
excluding more accurate poll results,
is not without its dangers. The judge
may tend to give too much credence
to the poll. The poll carries with it an
appearance of truthfulness, and the
judge is ordinarily not competent to
assess the factors and polling techniques which have been used to obtain
the percentages the pollster claims is
a true reflection of community feeling.
Thus the judge is placed in the difficult position of being required by law
to use his discretion, and yet of having
to decide what weight to give to evidence based on mathematical formulae
and polling techniques with which he
is not familiar. If public opinion polls
are liberally admitted as evidence, the
defense, which orders and controls the
poll, should submit proof that standard and proper polling techniques
were followed, so that the court will
be able to judge the accuracy of the
results.

Factors Governing Accuracy
of Polling Technique
The accuracy of the results of a
public opinion poll is dependent on
the polling technique employed and
the safeguards for accuracy followed. 20 Polling has in the last thirty
years become an accepted social science technique, and experimentation
has pinpointed the factors on which
accuracy depends. Five factors most
often mentioned are:
(1) The sample must be of ade.
17. See Waterbury, op. cit. supra note 16.
18. See Waterbury, op. cit. supra note 16 at
74.
19. See Metropolitan Opera Association, Inc.
v. Pilot Radio Corporation,189 Misc. 505 (N. Y.
1947).
20. Although a million persons were polled
by Literary Digest in 1936, faulty techniques
in failing to derive a proper cross-section resulted in the prediction that Landon would
win the Presidential election by a landslide.
The small margin of error by prominent pollsters in the 1948 Presidential election has also
been attributed to faulty techniques.
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quate size to provide for high mathematical accuracy.
(2) The questions asked must be
phrased so as to provide a true picture of the respondent's opinion.
(3) A proper cross-section of the
community must be interviewed so
that the answers are representative of
other persons within the community.
(4) Proper statistical techniques
must be used to evaluate the answers
and to derive the mathematical conclusions which should follow from
them.
(5) Competent interviewers capable of using judgment concerning the
truthfulness of the respondent and the
reliability of the cross-section must be
used.
Lack of attention to any of these five
factors may seriously jeopardize the
accuracy of the results obtained.
Size of the Sample. From the size
of the sample (the number of persons
interviewed) a mathematical percentage showing the standard error which
may be present can be obtained. Statisticians working in the field of probability have derived the following formula to show the standard error a poll
may contain based on the number of
persons interviewed:21

When a = the per cent of standard
error
p = the per cent of persons
interviewed who answered
the question the same way
.00 minus p
q the number of persons inN
terviewed
This formula will show us how many
persons must be interviewed in order
to obtain a certain desired percentage
of accuracy. For example, if 100 persons are interviewed, and 50 per cent
of them answer "Yes" to the question,
and 50 per cent answer "No", then by
substituting in the formula:
a = N/50 X 50/100
o =/2500/100
G25
o
5
Thus, in this example, the standard
error when 100 persons are sampled
would be at least 5 per cent. We
know, then, that if only 100 persons
are questioned, the smallest error possible from the standard mathematical

error alone will be 5 per cent. 22 All
of the other factors may cause additional error and decrease the accuracy
even more.

Phrasing of Questions: The
phrasing of questions asked by the interviewer is a vital factor in determining the accuracy of the poll; of
course, it cannot be mathematically
determined. If a question is leading,
misleading or contains "come-on"
words to elicit a certain answer, the
accuracy of the poll may be seriously
undermined. A number of studies
have been made on the influence of
the wording of questions on the answers given, and startling conclusions
have been found.23 In 1940 Hadley
Cantril asked persons the question:
Do you think the United States should
do more than it is now to help England
and France?
Later he asked the same question with
the addition of the words at the end
"in their fight against Hitler". He
found that the emotion-packed word
"Hitler" caused 9 per cent more persons to reply "Yes" to the question.24
Pollsters have found that there are
any number of magic words which

may also affect the nature of the answer given, and this, together with the
wording of questions, must be carefully considered to insure maximum accuracy.
Cross-Section of Community:
Proper polling technique requires that
the community to be sampled must be
divided into economic, cultural and
social groups and that a selection of
representative interviewees or areas be
made. 25 A large sampling may negate
the possibility of a sizable matheimatical standard error, but without proper
sampling, accuracy may be seriously
endangered. The 1936 Literary Digest poll is the classic example of poor
cross-section selection. Readers were
permitted to send in postcards with
their straw vote for President, and the
results were tabulated without any
cross-sectioning according to social and
economic class and geographical distribution. 27 As a result, the almost
one million votes which were received
reflected the opinion of more well-todo econonuic classes and the poll failed
to reflect the opinions of a majority
of the American voters.

order in which questions are asked

Statistical Techniques: Pollsters
have developed recognized and accepted techniques for translating the answers given by the interviewees into
meaningful mathematical percentages.
For a pollster to assume that because
seventy-five of 100 persons interviewed answered "Yes" to a certain
question, that 75 per cent of the community would also have the same
opinion, is far too unsophisticated for
accurate polling. The answers of certain persons and certain areas and
groups may need to be given more or
less weight than those of others.
The weighting of poll results may
demand expertise beyond that possessed by the pollster. Large polling

21. See BLANKENSHIP, CONSUMER AND OPINION
RESEARCH 117 (1943); Daniel, Statistically Significant Differences in Observed Per Cents,
J. AP. PSYCHOL. 826-830 (1940).
22. Tables have been developed to save the
trouble of working out the mathematical forsnula in each case, enabling one readily to
determine how many persons must be interviewed to achieve a given percentage of accuracy. See Link, How Many Interviews Are
Necessary for Results of a Certain Accuracy?
21 J. APP. PsYcrL. 1-17 (1937); BSowN, UsE
OF STATISTICAL TucNNIQuS.q IN CERTAIN PROnLEraS oF MARKET RESEARCH (1935). These tables
indicate that in order to obtain an error of
2
per cent, 400 persons must be interviewed,
if the "Yes" and "No" answers are evenly

divided, and 2,500 persons must be interviewed to give a 1 per cent error.
23. See Roslow and Blankenship, Phrasing
the Question in Consumer Research, J. APP.
PSYCHOL. 612-622 (1939); PAYNE, TuE App oF
AsKiNG QUESTIONS (1951); Parry & Crossley,
Validity of Responses to Survey Questions, 14
PuB. Opie. Q. 61 (1950).
24. Cantril, Experiments in the Wording of
Questions, 4 PuB. OrIN. Q. 330 (1940).
25. Roper, Wording Questions for the Polls,
4 Pu . OpIs. Q. 129-130 (1940)
26. See McNemar, Sampling in Psychological
Research, 37 PSYCIHOL. BULL. 331-365 (1940).
27. See GALLUP and RAE, Tun PULSE OF DEMOCRACY (1940).

carry connotations causing people to
answer the question a certain way.
"Socialism", "fascism", "dictator",
"radical" and "reactionary" are almost certain to color the answer given
by the interviewee. Elmo Roper in
1940 found that by changing the
question:
Do you think the U.S. should do
everything in its power to promote
world peace?
to read:
Do you think the U.S. should become involved in a plan to promote
world peace?
a considerably higher percentage of
"No"

answers

was

obtained.25
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organizations utilize the services of a
variety of persons-political scientists,
economists, sociologists, psychologists,
statisticians-to determine the proper
statistical weight to be given to particular areas and groups in each poll.
Random polls have been used and
have resulted in some degree of accuracy, but the method of relying on
interviewing every one thousand persons, for example, is too risky to be
given any strong weight as judicial
evidence.
Trained Interviewers: Finally, it
is important that the interviewers be
intelligent and trained in polling techniques.28 The ability to establish a
proper atmosphere for questioning and
for obtaining honest answers, without
causing the interviewee embarrass-

ment or anger, is a prerequisite for a
good interviewer. The intelligence to
discern honest answers from joking or
sham replies and to make a judgment
as to the classification of the person
questioned so that the cross-section
schedule may be preserved is also essential.

Competently Conducted
Polls Have Value
There is a definite trend toward the
use of opinion polls as judicial evidence. Long an accepted evidentiary
source in appellate hearings, tile public opinion poll has now come into its
own to provide proof of community
prejudice in hearings for continuance
and change of venue.
If the legal barriers against the ad-

Nominating Petitions
Delaware
The undersigned hereby nominate
Alexander L. Nichols of Wilmington
for the office of State Delegate for and
from Delaware to be elected in 1964
for a three-year term beginning at the
adjournment of the 1964 Annual Meeting:
William S. Megonigal, Jr., George
Tyler Coulson, David A. Drexler, Walter K. Stapleton, E. Norman Veasey,
John J. Morris, Jr., Albert W. James,
Alfred Fraczkowski, Arthur J. Sullivan, William F. Taylor, Jacob Kreshtool, Howard M. Handelman, Sotiere
S. Kapsalis, Garry G. Greenstein, Emmett J. Conte, Jr., John P. Daley,
Norman N. Aerenson, Joseph H. Flanzer, Thomas S. Lodge. Januar D. Bove,
Jr., Brereton Sturtevant, James M.
Mulligan, Jr., Arthur G. Connolly,
Robert W. Wakefield and Joseph P.
Hurley of Wilmington.

District of Columbia
The undersigned hereby nominate
David G. Bress of Washington to fill
the vacancy in the office of State Delegate for and from the District of
Columbia:
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William S. Thompson, Edward Bennett Williams, William Roy Vallance,
Charles H. Burton, John D. Conner,
Richard K. Lyon, John W. Cragun,
Paul H. Gantt, Una Rita Quenstedt,
Milton I. Baldinger, 1H. Thomas Austern, Harold E. Mott, William E.
Stewart, Jr., Frederic Solomon, Seymour M. Chase, Gerhard Van Arkel,
F. Elwood Davis, Fred Vinson, Earl
W. Kintner, F. Joseph Donohue, Alexander M. Heron, James R. Stoner,
Brice W. Rhyne, Valentine B. Deale
and William Blum, Jr., of Washington.

Idaho
The undersigned hereby nominate
J. Blaine Anderson of Blackfoot for
the office of State Delegate for and
from Idaho to be elected in 1964 for
a three-year term beginning at the adjournment of the 1964 Annual Meeting:
Thomas A. Miller, Paul B. Ennis,
Eugene C. Thomas and Don J. MeClenahan of Boise;
Thomas H. Church of Burley;
Robert L. Alexanderson and Wayne
E. Davis of Caldwell;
J. Ray Cox and Thomas A. Mitchell

American Bar Association Journal

missibility of public opinion polls
have been overcome, still their ready
admissibility is not without dangers.
While the results of public opinion
polls often look deceptively simple,
their accuracy depends on the techniques followed. Public opinion polls
represent a specialized area of social
science. Unless careful attention is
given to the size of the sample, the
wording of questions, the structure
of cross-section, the statistical techniques, and the competency of interviewers, their accuracy may be doubtful. But administered carefully and
used intelligently, the public opinion
poll can bring a degree of certainty to
venue and continuance hearings which
is now lacking.
28. See GALLUP and RAE, Op. cit. SuPra note
27.

of Coeur d'Alene;
Orval Hansen, John M. Sharp, Eugene L. Bush and Mary D. Adams of
Idaho Falls;
Marcus J. Ware and Wynne M.
Blake of Lewiston;
Grant L. Young of Rigby;
Sherman J. Bellwood and George
E. Redford of Rupert;
Keith Jergensen of St. Anthony;
Edward L. Benoit, Robert W. Stephan, Robert N. W. Balleisen, James
M. Cunningham, Lloyd J. Walker and
Douglas D. Kramer of Twin Falls.
Indiana
The undersigned hereby nominate
C. Severin Buschmann, Jr., of Indianapolis for the office of State Delegate
for and from Indiana to be elected in
1964 for a three-year term beginning
at the adjournment of the 1964 Annual
Mceting:
Philip S. Cooper and George 0.
Chambers of Anderson;
Clarence J. Donovan and Robert W.
Short of Bedford;
Thomas H. Branaman of Brownstown;
Paul D. Lawson and Arthur D. King
of Columbus;
(Continued on page 385)

